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In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious 
machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a 
framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas 
(i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly 
enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project 
dispute this possibility. For instance, Searle, in his Chinese room objection, argues that however 
sophisticated a computational system is, it can never exhibit intentionality; thus, would also fail to 
exhibit consciousness or any of its varieties. This paper argues that the proposed architecture 
mentioned above answers the problem posed by Searle, at least in part. Specifically, it argues that we 
could reformulate Searle’s worries in the Chinese room in terms of the three-stage artificial qualia 
model. And by doing so, we could see that the person doing all the translations in the room could realize 
the three areas in the proposed framework. Consequently, this demonstrates the actualization of self-




The field of machine consciousness (MC) focuses on 
developing machines that both have an inner world (i.e., 
subjectivity) and artificial consciousness (AC). Several 
critics, however, dispute the realizability of this project. 
Addressing the objections posed by Searle (1980) against 
computational systems, this paper argues for the 
plausibility of self-consciousness in machines. 
 
2. CONSCIOUSNESS AND AI 
 
Consciousness is often deemed integral in discussing 
intelligence and the mental lives of agents (Pfeifer and 
Scheier, 1999). In MC, modeling and implementing 
artificial consciousness in machines are at the top of the 
list of concerns. On the one hand, a number of researches 
in this field deal with subjectivity and consciousness 
architectures for machines. Several others, on the other 
hand, focus on using machine models for studying 
consciousness in general. Holland (2003) distinguishes 
between the two by differentiating strong AC from weak 
AC. 
 Synonymous to the distinction between weak and 
strong artificial intelligence1 (AI), Holland states that 
strong AC is geared towards building conscious machines. 
Meanwhile, he defines weak AC as designing machines 
that merely simulate consciousness. It has been argued 
that the differences between the two, nevertheless, are 
blurred and quite inseparable in practice2 (Clowes et al., 
2007). And, at present, findings in MC have inspired 
current AI research that the task of building human-like 
conscious machines seems to be closer than ever. Yet, 
                                                          
1 As defined by Searle (1980), weak AI is the position that claims 
that computers are useful tools in studying the mind. Strong AI, 
on the other hand, claims that the ―appropriately programmed 
computer really is a mind.‖ 
 
2 Likewise, Chella and Manzotti (2007) pose the question: ―For 
instance, if a machine could exhibit all behaviors normally 
associated with a conscious being, would it be a conscious 
machine?‖ 
many dispute the possibility of implementing 
consciousness in machines. Searle, for instance, has posed 
objections against the strong AI thesis; thus, also 
entailing his unfavorable stance towards the machine 
consciousness project. 
 
3. STRONG AI TO STRONG AC 
 
Since its inception, there have been many criticisms 
against the strong AI project like the ones given by 
Dreyfus (1979, 1992), who has specifically argued against 
classical artificial intelligence. For his part, Searle (1980) 
provides his own critique through his Chinese room 
argument, which supposedly demonstrates that all 
computational systems fail to exhibit intentionality. 
 In the thought experiment, Searle asks us to 
imagine a man (i.e., Searle himself) locked inside a room. 
The man trapped inside this room does not know any 
Chinese to a point that, for him, Chinese symbols are just 
meaningless squiggles. Now, suppose that the man is 
given a first batch of Chinese writing through slipping 
pieces of papers inside the room. Afterwards, he is again 
given a second batch of Chinese writing but, along with 
this, he also receives a set of rules for correlating it with 
the first batch. The set of rules are in English, and the 
man just so happens to be a native English speaker. Note 
here that the only way he can correlate the two batches is 
by identifying the different Chinese symbols based on 
their shapes. Then, he is given a third batch of Chinese 
writing and another set of rules in English on how to 
correlate the last batch with first two batches. 
 Searle further explains that the first batch of 
Chinese writing is actually a script, the second batch a 
story, and the last one are the questions. Meanwhile, the 
set of rules is equivalent to a computer program, which 
enables the man to answer questions about the story 
through manipulating Chinese symbols based solely on 
their shapes. Thus, he would be able to answer certain 
questions in Chinese even without understanding the 
language itself. Searle then asks us to imagine that, after 
a while, the man becomes really good (i.e., efficient) at 
answering questions in Chinese through memorizing the 
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rules. From the point of view of someone asking the 
questions, the man does understand Chinese given that 
he can supply correct answers satisfactorily. However, 
Searle maintains that this is not the case. 
 Using this Chinese room objection, Searle argues 
that it can never be said that computer programs are 
actually thinking. As he points out in his thought 
experiment, even if the man inside the room knows how 
to answer Chinese questions in Chinese, he actually does 
not understand anything at all beyond the manipulation 
of meaningless squiggles. To quote Searle, he states that 
(1980): 
―Intentionality in human beings (and animals) 
is a product of the causal features of the brain. 
Instantiating a computer program is never by 
itself a sufficient condition for intentionality... 
The form of the [Chinese room] argument is to 
show how a human agent could instantiate the 
program and still not have the relevant 
intentionality… Any attempt to create 
intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not 
succeed just by designing programs but would 
have to duplicate the causal powers of the 
human brain.‖ 
In short, intentionality, for Searle, cannot be realized by 
any computer program. And, it is not only intentionality 
that is at stake in Searle's thought experiment. Many 
have argued that, although the Chinese room was 
originally put forward by Searle as a direct objection 
against intentionality, it can also be seen as an argument 
against consciousness—that is, no computer program can 
exhibit consciousness or any of its varieties (e.g., self-
consciousness, introspection, reportability). 
 Chalmers (1997), for instance, maintains that, if 
Searle's thought experiment succeeds, it establishes that 
the Chinese room system also fails to realize 
consciousness. Thus, it could be said that consciousness is 
actually at the center of the Chinese room argument. 
Now, in order to show that consciousness could be 
implemented in machines, addressing the problems posed 
by Searle is a necessary step. For MC to overcome such 
objections, Chalmers best puts it that consciousness 
should taken seriously. Capture consciousness, and we 
have captured intentionality as well. And in the field of 
machine consciousness, models that could supposedly 
generate consciousness have been proposed including self-
consciousness architectures. 
 
4. ROBOT ARTIFICIAL QUALE 
 
As mentioned earlier, it seems like that once we have 
already accounted for consciousness, it follows that we 
have also taken intentionality into account. In MC, 
architectures such as the ones presented by Chella and 
Gaglio (2008) purportedly support qualia in machines. 
 Focusing on how to model robots with self-
consciousness, Chella and Gaglio maintain that robot 
artificial quale is realizable by implementing a robot 
cognitive architecture with three computational areas, 
namely: the (1) subconceptual, (2) conceptual, and (3) 
linguistic areas. Brief descriptions of these areas are as 
follows: 
1. Subconceptual area: Devoted to processing all 
the information coming from the sensors of a 
robot 
2. Conceptual area: Mediates the processes of the 
subconceptual and linguistic areas  
3. Linguistic area: Area where linguistic 
representation occurs, which somehow 
corresponds to a robot’s long-term memory 
Chella and Gaglio argue that these computational areas 
generate artificial qualia in machines. They claim that a 
robot with such architecture is capable of processing 
information from its built-in sensors (i.e., through its 
subconceptual area) with the 3D information stored in its 
conceptual area. Thus, the process leads to the generation 
a 2D viewer-dependent reconstructed image of a scene 
that the robot currently perceives. 
The reconstructed 2D model is not static image 
in the sense that its construction is done with an active 
process. Chella and Gaglio further maintain that the 
bases of the robot’s artificial qualia are the conceptual 
and linguistic areas. 
In short, Chella and Gaglio are presenting a 
model that possibly gives robots the capability of self-
consciousness (Chella and Manzotti, 2007). In this 
proposed architecture, the higher-order of perception of 
the robot is the basis of its self-consciousness. It can then 
be argued that, if indeed the model supports self-
consciousness, the agent itself is in fact conscious. Note 
here that self-consciousness has been considered a type of 
consciousness in general. And it has been argued by some 
(Chalmers, 1997) that this kind of consciousness, along 
with the other varieties, has both phenomenal and 
psychological aspects. 
Assuming that self-consciousness could indeed be 
modeled in machines, we could then reformulate Searle’s 
Chinese room system in terms of Chella and Gaglio’s 
three-stage artificial qualia model. 
 
5. AC REFORMULATION 
 
To re-cast the Chinese room system so that it too exhibits 
self-consciousness (i.e., including intentionality), let us 
implement to this the robot cognitive architecture that 
employs the three computational areas proposed by 
Chella and Gaglio3. And by doing this, it could be seen 
that the man inside the room performing all the 
translations, if further argued, could realize the three 
areas in the proposed framework. 
                                                          
3 A colleague, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, has mentioned that what 
is actually being done here is to present a modified version of the 
systems reply to Searle’s Chinese room argument. 
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In the Chinese room system, it can be said that 
Chella and Gaglio’s subconceptual area has already been 
accounted for. Recall that this area is responsible for 
processing all the information from the sensors of a robot; 
thus, it could be argued that the man inside the room, 
who in the process of performing all the translations, is 
already implementing the subconceptual area. The next 
step is then to implement the conceptual and linguistic 
areas. 
After gathering the relevant information (e.g., 
the presence of a Chinese symbol 算7 in front of him), let 
us try to implement the conceptual and linguistic areas 
by adding two more men inside the room. Suppose that, 
at time T1, the first man X is continuously processing 算7, 
and he simultaneously sends this information to a second 
man Y. Y’s task then is to solely process 算7 and correlate 
it with a set of Chinese symbols that was originally given, 
or ―programmed,‖ to him. This set contains different types 
of the Chinese symbols (算, 台, 叫…), which also stores 
the different tokens of these symbols (算1, 算2, 算3… 台1, 
台2, 台3… 叫1, 叫2, 叫3…) that the system has previously 
encountered. The next step for Y is to find a match 
between 算7 and the symbol that closely resembles it. For 
instance, let 算6 be the closest Chinese character that 
resembles 算7. Further, Y would then have to generate a 
viewer-dependent reconstruction that resembles 算7 (i.e., 
by constantly matching the symbol 算7 with 算6), while 
simultaneously correlating it with the sensory data being 
currently viewed by X at T2, or any succeeding time after 
T1. As for the third man Z, he is now then capable of 
generating and fixing linguistic representations to the 
viewer-dependent reconstruction of 算7. 
In this reformulation of the Chinese room, it can 
be said that the modified system now supports self-
consciousness wherein three men are just performing 
tasks that were just programmed to them. However, it 
can be further argued that, given that these men are just 
executing preset operations, it also seems possible to 
implement the said programs into three distinct robots, 
Xr, Yr, and Zr. Now it is quite reasonable to think that 
these robots would accomplish their specified tasks as 
effectively as their human counterparts. Finally, given 
that it seems possible to design a single program that 
could execute the tasks identified in the subconceptual, 
conceptual, and linguistic areas, why not just develop an 
analogous architecture for a single robot? It can then be 
argued that this is what Chella and Gaglio have in mind 
in their three-stage artificial qualia model. The Chinese 
room system reformulated so that it now supports a 




It seems like that Searle’s’ Chinese room system could be 
reformulated in terms of Chella and Gaglio’s three-stage 
artificial qualia model. After modifying the system, it 
could be argued that the person doing all the translations 
realizes the three computational areas proposed in the 
framework. Thus, this demonstrates the actualization of 
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